Mechanism
The new Standing Committee will be finally decided by the retired Standing Committee and the current Standing Committee through consultation and consensus.
There may be no express provisions on what to do if a consensus cannot be reached on the new standing committee, especially if the current general secretary insists on refusing to quit in violation of the party constitution. The current situation has never occurred before. The Xi faction will think that this loophole can be exploited to seek re-election.
The military will in principle support the resolutions formed by the mechanism. In the absence of a consensus, there is no express provision for what the military should do.
Situation
Since the Beidaihe meeting or earlier, the consensus among incumbent and retired Standing Committee members is that Xi will step down on time. Xi Jinping proposed to stay in power at a meeting in Beidaihe, but was met with overwhelming opposition. Xi probably said on the surface that he would step down according to the chapter.
At the same time, Xi Jinping has not given up on fighting for re-election and trying to gain security guarantees using advance-to-retreat tactic just in case he fails to continue in power. His method: use the propaganda machine he controls to create public opinion; use the power of the Xi faction to control domestic society through the epidemic (high probability approach: release poisoning -> implement zero policy -> affiliated companies operate vaccines to obtain income -> control society); provoke the Taiwan Strait incidents internationally to control society and increase the possibility of re-election thorugh martial law; and support Putin's Russian aggression against Ukraine.
The factions opposed to Xi's re-election have formed a united front and have been persuading Xi himself and members of the Xi faction through various channels to persuade him to step down on time.
There are disagreements within the Xi faction over whether they should life-and-death struggle to stay in power. There are signs that Xi Jinping is uncertain.
The signals of Xi not being re-elected
No support from retired Standing Committee members, no public support from current Standing Committee members other than himself, and what's being heard is expressions of disapproval. Politburo Standing Committee Wang member Huning's public speeches on August 31 and September 2 can be understood as implicit support
No support from retired or current Central Military Commission (CMC) vice-chairmen or CMC members. The latest: When Xi Jinping summoned several theater commanders to Beijing as the chairman of the Central Military Commission, they shied back and only sent their deputies to report to Xi in Beijing. Implications: 1. Fear of being arrested when entering Beijing; 2. Consulted with each other; 3. Avoid being forced to choose side to support Xi’s re-election; 4. Unwilling to provoke trouble with the neighboring countries for Xi’s re-election
The People's Daily press release issued by the Politburo for the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China did not mention "4422" (four self-confidence, four awareness, two maintenance and two establishment, which are key indicator phrases for implicit support for Xi’s remaining in power), but five in one (Hu Jintao's language), and summing up experience.
Li Keqiang presided over the drafting of the 20th National Congress report (unconfirmed information) and economic work
The 4422 and other touting statements in the 10-year retrospective by the provincial party newspaper where Xi faction is in power are filtered out by the People's Daily
Most central ministerial and provincial officials did not support Xi's re-election
Rumors about Xi's overseas visit have been falsified one by one. On September 4th, it was reported that People's Congress Chairman Li Zhanshu will visit the four countries, and the task of this visit to Russia and South Korea should have been undertaken by Xi. The event of Li's replacement of Xi's visit implies that it is not conducive to Xi's re-election
The United States, its allies and other countries that recognize universal values have expressed distrust of Xi's re-election in various ways, and have increasingly strengthened their actions to safeguard the security of the Taiwan Strait and protect Taiwan. On September 5, Truss won the election for the leader of the British Conservative Party. After taking office as prime minister, she will continue Johnson's support-Ukraine policy internationally, and strengthen the practices of the Five Eyes Alliance and NATO to safeguard the security of the Taiwan Strait, and increase the possibility of Xi's failure to invade Taiwan by force. This is counterproductive to Xi's re-election
On August 31, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a report: China may have been committing "crimes against humanity" against ethnic minorities in Xinjiang
Influential groups at home oppose Xi's re-election. The 12-point appeal from the domestic intellectual community, issued on September 5, is the latest sign of opposition to Xi's attempt for re-election
The series of extreme actions of Xi all-out struggle for re-election indicate that according to the mechanism and rules (that is, the conventional practice as dictated by the mechanism) should not be re-elected
Signals of Xi's all-out fighting for re-election
Control society through the epidemic domestically using power in hands of Xi faction
Support Putin's ongoing war on Russia's invasion of Ukraine, cooperate with Russia, continue to increase the threat to East Asian security
Continue to provoke incidents in the Taiwan Strait, create the conditions for control of society
Wang Huning, member of the Politburo Standing Committee, mentioned 4422 in his public speeches on August 31 and September 2
Chen Xi, Principal of the Central Party School and Chief of the Central Organization Department, mentioned "4422" in the school's fall quarter opening speech on September 2.
Provincial and ministerial-level officials of Xi faction create public opinion to support Xi's re-election
The mouthpiece controlled by the Xi faction has increased its intensity and breadth to publicize in overseas media that Xi will be re-elected as a "great leader"
Xi faction fears being held accountable. The first thing they fear is to be held accountable for being suspected of conspiring to release the virus, playing with the virus to disrupt the international order, and destroying the "one country, two systems" United Nations-certified Sino-British agreement on Hong Kong, using violence to suppress Hong Kong to implement the national security law, and suspected of having committed crimes against humanity to ethnic minorities in Xinjiang and control domestic society. This is highly likely the first reason for Xi's all-out fight for re-election
Xi's own character and behavior trajectory
Signals of Xi unsure if he wants to fight for re-election
Use intelligence channels to understand whether the United States and its allies will defend Taiwan in the event of a future Chinese invasion of Taiwan
Uncertain whether the situation of international and domestic opposition can be effectively suppressed, transferred or weakened once re-elected for three positions
Uncertain about the outcome of Putin's Russian invasion of Ukraine and its implications for future Chinese invasions of Taiwan
Uncertain about how the world will trace the origin of the virus outbreak once he is re-elected to three positions, especially whether he will receive a detention, subpoena or be hit when he travels abroad as president of the country
Xi is uncertain about whether, after remaining in power with three positions, it will be successful to follow the road of North Korea's closing border and locking-down the country and to isolate China itself from the mainstream of human civilization in the world
Endgame
Xi will be re-elected to three positions (General Secretary of the Party, Chairman of the Military Commission, and President of the State), with possibility of <50%
Xi can only be re-elected to three positions through a coup, with probability > 90%. That is, the probability of Xi being re-elected to three positions through the normal process of the mechanism is less than 10%
Xi resigns as party general secretary, with probability > 50%
After Xi resigns as party general secretary, he is re-elected as both chairman of the Military Commission and president of the country, with possibility <50%
Xi will only be re-elected as either the Chairman of the Military Commission or the President of the State, with a probability of ~50%. The possibility of being re-elected as the chairman of the Military Commission is greater than that of the chairman of the country. The decision-making mechanism should realize that if Xi is re-elected as the latter, the CCP will be placed in a passive position that is difficult to reverse when the origin of the virus is tracked down by the world in the future
If Xi is re-elected to three positions through a coup d’etat, the possibility of a coup d’etat by bureaucrats, military and civilians that overthrow Xi will increase to > 2/3; if Putin’s invasion of Ukraine fails completely at this time, and a coup d’etat that overthrows Xi will occur, the possibility will increase to > 4/ 5; in the event of a military invasion or blockade of Taiwan under the above circumstances, the possibility of a coup to overthrow Xi will increase to 9/10
If Xi is only re-elected as the chairman of the Military Commission, he will do his best to win back all power, the possibility is no less than 9/10
The analysis and forecast above will be updated as events develop.
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